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The evaluation of uncertainties in quantum measurements is problematic since the correct value
of an observable between state preparation and measurement is experimentally inaccessible. In
Ozawa’s formulation of uncertainty relations for quantum measurements, the correct value of an
observable is represented by the operator of that observable. Here, I consider the implications of
this operator-based assignment of values to individual systems and discuss the relation with weak
values and weak measurement statistics.
I. INTRODUCTION
In its widely popularized form, the uncertainty prin-
ciple states that it is impossible to know all properties
of a quantum system at the same time. A more care-
ful formulation would be that the quantum formalism
does not allow a description of quantum systems in terms
of a complete set of physical properties. Whether the
unknown properties actually exist or have any physi-
cal meaning is a matter of controversy since the early
days of quantum mechanics. That this controversy could
continue for so long seems to point to a rather pecu-
liar failure of the established scientific methods. From
these methods, one would expect that the combination
of experiment and theory should eventually result in an
unambiguous description of physical reality. However,
the uncertainty principle has played a crucial role in pre-
venting a resolution of the controversies: any attempt
to uncover more about the physical reality of an indi-
vidual system than the uncertainty principle allows must
fail because of uncontrollable disturbances and errors in
the measurement. This problem not only limits the ex-
perimental possibilities, but also restricts the statements
derived from purely theoretical considerations of possible
measurements. Therefore, neither experiment nor theory
provides unambiguous statements about physical reality.
Recent advances in quantum information related tech-
nologies have renewed the interest in the fundamental
physics described by the quantum formalism. Applica-
tions of entanglement seem to indicate that there might
be intriguing new ways to circumvent the uncertainty
principle. In the light of these developments, it might
be possible to resolve the problems associated with un-
certainties at their most fundamental level by directly
addressing the dynamics of quantum measurements in
the Hilbert space formalism. An important contribution
to this effort was made by Ozawa, who introduced an
uncertainty relation for the error and the disturbance of
quantum measurements that includes the initial quan-
tum state of the system [1]. Recently, experiments on
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sequential spin measurements were used to illustrate the
physics described by the general formalism introduced by
Ozawa [2]. However, these experiments could not provide
direct evidence of the errors and the disturbances, since
the actual properties of the system between preparation
and initial measurement remain as inaccessible as ever.
Instead, the experimentalists used a tomographic recon-
struction of the elements contributing to the theoretically
predicted error. Whether this analysis is convincing or
not depends on ones interpretation of the theory. In the
following, I will therefore examine the basic definitions
used in Ozawa’s theory and identify the implicit assump-
tions they make about the physics described by the quan-
tum formalism.
II. MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTIES IN
THE HILBERT SPACE FORMALISM
The most compact formulation of measurement the-
ory is given by a set of measurement operators {Mˆm},
where each operator represents the effects of a measure-
ment outcome m on an initial state | ψ〉. Specifically, the
probability of obtaining the outcome m is given by the
squared norm of the Hilbert space vector Mˆm | ψ〉, and
the state after the measurement is given by the direction
of that vector in Hilbert space. In this theory, the mea-
surement resultm can be used to estimate the most likely
value of an observable Aˆ before the measurement by as-
signing a measurement result Am to that observable. If
the measurement operator Mˆm | ψ〉 commutes with the
observable Aˆ, we can establish the correct value of Aˆ by
a final measurement of the outcomes a described by the
eigenstates | a〉 of Aˆ. Since the operator Aˆ describes the
assignment of the correct eigenvalue Aa to the eigenstate
| a〉, we can derive the average squared error of the result
Am directly from the output states,
ǫ2out(A) =
∑
m
||(Am − Aˆ)Mˆm | ψ〉||
2. (1)
This uncertainty is experimentally accessible, since it de-
scribes a prediction of Aˆ for the output state. If Mˆm | ψ〉
and Aˆ commute, the measurement of m does not change
2the value of Aˆ, and the final measurement result Aa can
be identified with the correct value of Aˆ before the mea-
surement of m. It may therefore be tempting to assume
that the correct value of Aˆ before the measurement of m
can always be obtained by simply changing the operator
ordering. This is the implicit assumption made by Ozawa
in the formulation of the measurement error [1, 2]:
ǫ2(A) =
∑
m
||Mˆm(Am − Aˆ) | ψ〉||
2. (2)
Problematic about this formulation is that the operator
Aˆ cannot be evaluated using a measurement. Therefore,
the assignment of the correct value now depends on an
interpretation of the Hilbert space formalism that cannot
be verified experimentally.
The same problem arises in the determination of the
disturbance of an observable Bˆ caused by the measure-
ment interaction. A measurement of the actual distur-
bance requires that the input state is an eigenstate of Bˆ,
so that the disturbance can be given by the difference
in the eigenvalues between the initial state and a final
measurement on the output. In this case, the operator Bˆ
evaluates the initial value of Bˆ when placed on the right
hand side of Mˆm, and the final value of Bˆ when placed
on the left hand side of Mˆm. Ozawa generalizes this op-
erator assignment of values to define the disturbance as
η2(B) =
∑
m
||(BˆMˆm − MˆmBˆ) | ψ〉||
2. (3)
Again, the implicit assumption is that the operator Bˆ
represents the correct value of Bˆ, even when it cannot be
evaluated experimentally.
Significantly, Ozawa’s theory of measurement uncer-
tainties depends on the assumption that the operator
formalism of Hilbert space gives us access to unobserved
physical properties by effectively identifying the precise
value of an observable between preparation and measure-
ment. At this point, it may be worthwhile to reflect a bit
on the original motivation for the uncertainty principle:
that the Hilbert space formalism cannot describe physical
objects in terms of their individual physical properties.
For this reason, Heisenberg was not actually concerned
with the question of whether unobserved values could be
reconstructed or estimated based on prior knowledge. In
fact, he expressed the opinion that a complete descrip-
tion of the past was still possible. A direct quote to that
effect can be found in Heisenbergs introduction of the
physical principles of quantum theory (original German
with my own translation)[3]:
“Vorher sei jedoch bemerkt, dass die Unbe-
stimmtheitsrelation sich offenbar nicht auf die
Vergangenheit bezieht. Denn wenn zunaechst
die Elektronengeschwindigkeit bekannt ist,
dann der Ort genau gemessen wird, so lassen
sich auch fuer die Zeit vor der Ortsmes-
sung die Elektronenorte genau ausrechnen;
fuer diese Vergangenheit ist ∆q∆p dann
kleiner als der uebliche Grenzwert. Diese
Kenntnis der Vergangenheit hat jedoch rein
spekulativen Charakter, denn sie geht (we-
gen der Impulsaenderung bei der Ortsmes-
sung) keineswegs als Anfangsbedingung in ir-
gendeine Rechnung ueber die Zukunft des
Elektrons ein und tritt ueberhaupt in keinem
physikalischen Experiment in Erscheinung.”
“Beforehand it should be noted that the un-
certainty relations obviously do not apply to
the past. If the velocity of an electron is ini-
tially known, and the position is measured
with precision after that, then the positions of
the electron may be calculated precisely also
for the times before the measurement of posi-
tion; for this past, ∆q∆p is then smaller than
the usual limit. However, this knowledge of
the past is merely speculative in nature, since
(because of the change of momentum in the
position measurement) it can never enter as
initial condition into any calculation concern-
ing the future of the electron and does not
appear in any physical experiment at all.”
Here, Heisenberg suggests that the laws of physics may
allow us to know the history of an individual particle
with precision. However, he continues by dismissing the
notion that this might have any effect on experiments,
since the implications for future measurement outcomes
have been erased by the disturbance of the velocity in the
position measurement. As a result, Heisenberg failed to
examine whether the Hilbert space formalism might have
any concequences for the classical notions of causality
that he uses to explain the physics of the measurement
process.
III. VALUES FOR UNOBSERVED
OBSERVABLES
As Heisenberg suggested, it may be possible to deter-
mine the precise values of unobserved observables from
the initial preparation and the final measurement result
obtained for each individual system. In Ozawa’s theory,
this can be done by adding a final projective measure-
ment {| f〉}. The probabilities of the outcomes are then
given by
p(m, f) = ||〈f | Mˆm | ψ〉||
2. (4)
The measurement error can now be expressed as an av-
erage over the squared measurement errors for each indi-
vidual outcome (m, f),
ǫ2(A) =
∑
m,f
p(m, f)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣Am − 〈f | MˆmAˆ | ψ〉〈f | Mˆm | ψ〉
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
2
. (5)
3Ozawa’s theory therefore implies that the correct value of
Aˆ between preparation and measurement is given by the
complex weak value of Aˆ conditioned by both the initial
measurement result m and the final measurement result
f .
The fact that Ozawa’s theory is closely related to weak
values was first pointed out by Hall, who noted that the
best estimate Am for a given measurement result m was
given by the real part of the weak value defined by the
initial state and the measurement of m [4]. Interestingly,
we can now see that, for projective measurements, the
error of an estimate given by the real part of the weak
value is exactly equal to the imaginary part of the weak
value [5]. Effectively, the definition of measurement er-
rors given by Ozawa implies that the complex weak values
provide a precise description of the observables between
preparation and measurement, so that any difference be-
tween the measurement result and the weak value - even
if purely imaginary - corresponds to an error in the esti-
mated value of Aˆ.
The same logic can be applied to the disturbance.
Here, an even more interesting case emerges if we con-
sider an arbitrary final measurement, so that neither the
initial nor the final value of Bˆ is actually known. In this
case, Ozawa’s disturbance can be derived from the dif-
ferences between the weak values before and after the
measurement,
η2(B) =∑
m,f
p(m, f)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ 〈f | BˆMˆm | ψ〉〈f | Mˆm | ψ〉 −
〈f | MˆmBˆ | ψ〉
〈f | Mˆm | ψ〉
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
2
. (6)
Thus, the situation before the measurement is fully char-
acterized by the initial state | ψ〉 and the final state
〈f | Mˆm, while the situation after the measurement is
fully characterized by the initial state Mˆm | ψ〉 and the
final state 〈f |.
In the light of Heisenbergs considerations, it would
seem that quantum theory makes precise and uncertainty
free statements about physical reality whenever the ini-
tial state and the final state are given by pure states.
If Ozawa’s definitions of uncertainties are correct (and
they are consistent with the conventional use of Oper-
ators in Hilbert space), we have to conclude that such
precise statements can be represented by the weak val-
ues of the operators that describe the physical system in
question. However, this raises a problem for Heisenberg’s
assumption about the physics of a system between prepa-
ration and measurement: the quantum formalism assigns
complex values to the operators, and even the real parts
are not consistent with the eigenvalues observed in strong
measurements. It seems that the quantum formalism has
much more serious consequences for the description of
unobserved observables than Heisenberg anticipated.
IV. QUASI-REALITIES AND
CONTEXTUALITY
Experimentally, the problem with weak values is that
they cannot be confirmed by precise measurements on
individual systems. In fact, weak values appear to con-
tradict the initial justification of the operator formalism,
where an operator is seen as a statistical tool that at-
taches an eigenvalue to the measurement result repre-
sented by a projection on the eigenstate. How can it be
that the weak values appear as uncertainty free values
in a theory based on the standard operator formalism,
when they do not correspond to any of the alternative
measurement realities represented by the projectors on
the eigenstate?
These considerations lead us to an alternative inter-
pretation of Ozawa’s uncertainties given by Lund and
Wiseman [6], where the correct values of Aˆ and Bˆ are de-
scribed by the eigenvalues associated with the eigenstate
projectors. Since the expectation values of the projec-
tors correspond to the probabilities of the measurement
outcomes, their weak values can be identified with con-
ditional probabilities. The quantum state | ψ〉 can then
be expressed by a joint probability distribution for the
precise measurement outcome | a〉 and the actual mea-
surement outcome (m, f),
p(a,m, f) = 〈f | Mˆm | a〉〈a | ψ〉〈ψ | Mˆ
†
m | f〉. (7)
As shown by Lund and Wiseman, the measurement er-
ror ǫ2(A) can then be determined by assigning a (pos-
sibly negative) statistical weight equal to the real part
of p(a,m, f) to the squared errors given by the differ-
ences between the eigenvalues Aa and the measurement
outcomes Am,
ǫ2(A) =
∑
a,m,f
Re (p(a,m, f)) (Am −Aa)
2
. (8)
Instead of associating a single correct value with the ac-
tual measurement outcome (m, f), this relation intro-
duces a quasi-reality defined by the joint assignment of
reality to the measurement outcomesv(m, f) and | a〉. In
the case of the disturbance η2(B), the different measure-
ments are given by the eigenstates | bi〉 for Bˆ before the
measurement, and the eigenstates | bf〉 for Bˆ after the
measurement. Ozawa’s definition of the disturbance can
then be expressed in terms of a joint probability for differ-
ent outcomes bi and bf before and after the measurement
of m,
η2(B) =
∑
bi,m,bf
Re (p(bi,m, bf )) (Bf −Bi)
2
. (9)
Intuitively, these relations would suggest the simultane-
ous assignments of well-defined measurement outcomes
to non-commuting properties. However, the joint prob-
abilities associated with such an assignment are gener-
ally complex, with non-positive real parts. The joint as-
signment of outcomes to non-commuting measurements
4therefore corresponds to a quasi-reality that can never be
observed in any actual experiment.
V. QUANTUM DETERMINISM
It may seem confusing that the identification of weak
values with the precise values of an unobserved observ-
able is consistent with the result obtained from a sta-
tistical distribution over the eigenvalues of the same ob-
servable. To understand how the precision of weak val-
ues can be reconciled with the complex valued statistics
over eigenvalues, it is necessary to take a closer look the
fundamental characteristics of weak measurement statis-
tics [7–9]. For the present discussion, it might be suf-
ficient to consider the conditional measurement error
ǫ2(A|m, f) derived from the complex conditional prob-
abilities p(a|m, f),
ǫ2(A|m, f)=
∑
a
Re (p(a|m, f)) (Am −Aa)
2
=Re
(
〈f | Mˆm(Am − Aˆ)
2 | ψ〉
〈f | Mˆm | ψ〉
)
. (10)
Thus the contribution to the measurement error ǫ2 for a
measurement outcome (m, f) is given by the real part of
the weak value of (Am − Aˆ)
2. This is different from the
error given by the squared difference between Am and the
weak value of Aˆ, since the weak value of Aˆ2 is different
from the square of the weak value of Aˆ. This difference
corresponds to a definition of weak value uncertainties,
∆A2weak(m, f) =
Re

∑
a
p(a|m, f)
(
〈f | MˆmAˆ | ψ〉
〈f | Mˆm | ψ〉
−Aa
)2 . (11)
Since the average of these weak value uncertainties must
be zero for all m and f , the individual values are both
negative and positive. This is a consequence of the com-
plex valued joint probabilities that describe the actual
relations between measurement outcomes that cannot be
obtained at the same time.
It is remarkable that the use of complex probabilities
can establish a relation between the seemingly determin-
istic definition of uncertainty free values and the statis-
tical formalism of conditional probabilities. As pointed
out in [8], the precise connection is described by the com-
plex phases of the weak conditional probabilities, which
are related to the classical distance between the phase
space points associated with initial, final, and interme-
diate states. Quantum mechanics therefore results in a
fundamental modification of classical determinism that
reconciles the apparent randomness of quantum effects
with continuous state evolutions [9]. In the classical
limit, we can determine the value between preparation
and measurement from initial and final conditions using
the known equations of motion (as suggested by Heisen-
berg for the electron with known initial momentum and
final position). In quantum mechanics, the best approx-
imation to classical determinism seems to be given by
weak values. However, a more detailed analysis reveals
complex valued probabilities that describe the relations
between different measurement contexts. As shown in [9],
classical determinism emerges from these complex valued
statistics in the limit of low resolution. The extension of
statistics to complex valued probabilities can therefore
lift the contradictions between deterministic theories and
probabilistic theories, resulting in a contextual determin-
ism that is expressed in terms of statistical relations with
an average uncertainty of zero.
VI. PHYSICS AND FORMALISM:
THE LACK OF A MICROSCOPIC PICTURE
In classical physics, we can use the known relations be-
tween different quantities to calculate the values of un-
observed observables. This calculation reflects a belief in
the existence of a microscopic measurement independent
reality, where the state of a system is described by a phase
space point that summarizes the precise values of all
physical properties. In quantum mechanics, the opera-
tor representation obscures the relation between different
physical properties. Instead of phase space points, quan-
tum states represent probability distributions. It would
therefore be fair to argue that conventional quantum me-
chanics does not provide any microscopic picture of in-
dividual physical systems. However, as Heisenberg indi-
cated, such a microscopic picture should re-emerge when
we discuss the properties of a system between prepara-
tion and measurement.
Ozawa’s approach to uncertainties in quantum mea-
surements is based on the assumption that the operator
formalism should also describe the unobserved observ-
ables of a system. The result corresponds to the assign-
ment of weak values to the state between preparation
and measurement. However, this assignment does not
provide a microscopic picture of reality. In particular,
the assignment of truth values to precise measurement
outcomes does not result in a well-defined assignment of
“0” or “1”, but needs to be represented by complex con-
ditional probabilities.
Significantly, the complex conditional probability can
describe uncertainties of zero without specifying a par-
ticular outcome. In this case, the relation between the
initial, the final, and the unobserved property of the sys-
tem is precisely defined in terms of complex conditional
probabilities, such that there cannot be any joint real-
ity of all three. For individual systems, the maximal
amount of information is the combination of initial and
final conditions represented by a pair of pure states. Inci-
dentally, this corresponds to the definition of a classical
phase space point by a pair of conjugate variables [9].
Ozawa’s definitions indicate that the uncertainties of all
unobserved observables can then be reduced to zero by
evaluating their weak values. However, the overlap with
5eigenstates of any unobserved property is given by a com-
plex conditional probability. This indicates that contex-
tuality is now a fundamental part of the description: the
realities of individual systems cannot be represented by
a summary of all physical properties, but must include
a specific reference to the properties defined by the past
and the future of the system in question.
If the operator formalism is accepted as a valid rep-
resentation of physical properties, it is also necessary
to accept this contextual notion of microscopic reality.
Significantly, the formalism does provide a unique defini-
tion of microscopic reality for individual systems, once we
agree to take the fundamental definitions to their logical
conclusions. This may be the most surprising outcome
of the present investigation, since the conventional for-
mulation of quantum mechanics is deliberately unclear
and ambiguous about the actual relation between non-
commuting observables and the necessary modifications
of the phase space picture of classical physics associated
with them.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Ozawa’s formulation of uncertainties is interesting be-
cause it derives statements about unobserved observables
from the standard formulation of quantum mechanics.
This derivation suggests that the standard formalism is
much more specific about the relation between physical
properties than our textbook knowledge would have us
believe. Indeed, a closer look at the mathematics reveals
that the statistics of weak measurement provides a key to
unlocking the mysteries of uncertainties: Ozawa’s formu-
lation shows that the standard formalism assigns weak
values and weak conditional probabilities to unobserved
observables, since this is the only assignment consistent
with the representation of measurement realities by pro-
jection operators.
It is important to note that this assignment is precise
in the sense that its average uncertainties are zero. It
therefore corresponds to classical expectations such as
the one expressed by Heisenberg about the derivation of
an electron trajectory from position and momentum in
[3]. At the same time, quantum mechanics prevents the
identification of unobserved realities by representing such
precise relations in terms of complex conditional proba-
bilities. It should therefore be possible to formulate a
more detailed microscopic explanation of quantum me-
chanics by showing how such complex conditional proba-
bilities can represent deterministic relations between non-
commuting physical properties [9].
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